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Abstract—Cloud service providers offer their customers with
on-demand and cost-effective services, scalable computing, and
network infrastructures. Enterprises migrate their services to the
cloud to utilize the benefit of cloud computing such as eliminating
the capital expense of their computing need. There are security
vulnerabilities and threats in the cloud. Many researches have
been proposed to analyze the cloud security using Graphical
Security Models (GSMs) and security metrics. In addition, it
has been widely researched in finding appropriate defensive
strategies for the security of the cloud. Moving Target Defense
(MTD) techniques can utilize the cloud elasticity features to
change the attack surface and confuse attackers. Most of the
previous work incorporating MTDs into the GSMs are theoretical
and the performance was evaluated based on the simulation. In
this paper, we realized the previous framework and designed,
implemented and tested a cloud security assessment tool in a real
cloud platform named UniteCloud. Our security solution can (1)
monitor cloud computing in real-time, (2) automate the security
modeling and analysis and visualize the GSMs using a Graphical
User Interface via a web application, and (3) deploy three MTD
techniques including Diversity, Redundancy, and Shuffle on the
real cloud infrastructure. We analyzed the automation process
using the APIs and showed the practicality and feasibility of
automation of deploying all the three MTD techniques on the
UniteCloud.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing; Moving Target Defense; Se-
curity Analysis; Security Modeling; Cloud Security Framework
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the cloud computing as a powerful and
affordable context for users has caused many business and
commerce migrate to this on-demand, scalable, and cost-
effective paradigm. The organizations outsource their network
infrastructures, computing needs, software and services into
the cloud in order to benefit from the cloud’s utilities such as
economical benefits (cutting off physical resources and dam-
ages). However, many organizations and enterprises find this
migration undesirable due to security issues in the cloud [1],
[2].
Many security mechanisms and defensive strategies have
been proposed by researchers both theoretically and practi-
cally. In order to improve the security of cloud computing, it is
important to evaluate the security posture of cloud. Graphical
Security Models (GSMs) (such as Attack Graphs (AGs)[3],
Attack Trees (ATs) [4], Attack-defense threes (ADTrees)[5],
HARMs [6]) are the widely adopted methods to analyze the
security of enterprise networks [7], [8]; a GSM can be used
to define attack surfaces and summarize the attack scenarios,
and compute security metrics. Morever, GSMs can be used to
evaluate the cloud security posture. GSMs can also be used
to evaluate the effectiveness of defensive techniques such as
Moving Target Defense (MTD). MTD techniques are proactive
defensive techniques and the primary idea is mainly changing
the attack surface in order to introduce confusions to attackers
carrying out cyber attackers. There are a few researches in this
line. Only a few researches have been proposed for the uses
of GSM in evaluating MTD techniques for cloud computing.
However, most of the previous researches are theoretical and
use simulation only [9], [10], [11], [12] to show the feasibility
of their approaches.
To the best of our knowledge, the incorporation of GSMs and
MTD techniques together for security analysis and deployment
of MTD techniques in the infrastructures of the real clouds has
not been proposed.
In this paper, we tackle the aforementioned shortcomings
by designing and development of a cloud security assessment
framework which can automatically monitor, model, and ana-
lyze a private cloud security and deploy the MTD techniques
on the cloud infrastructures. In this paper, we focus on the
practical side rather theoretical appraisal. We demonstrate
the practicality of implementation, feasibility of automation,
usability of the project using a real cloud platform named
UniteCloud [13], [14].
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• Cloud monitoring: We developed a cloud security frame-
work which can automate the process of cloud vulnera-
bility scanning in order to collect the information of the
cloud’s components together with the vulnerabilities of
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each component.
• Cloud security evaluation: Cloud security framework can
create the HARM based on the collected information for
security analysis and MTD evaluation purposes.
• MTD Deployment: Cloud security framework automated
the deployment of three MTD techniques such as Diver-
sity, Redundancy, and Shuffle on the real cloud infras-
tructure.
• Automation evaluation: We investigated on a private
cloud platform and uses of OpenStack Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs) to analyze the automation
process for implementation steps.
• Automation evaluation: We developed a graphical user in-
terface (GUI) as a web application for interaction between
cloud security framework and security experts including
both cloud provider view and HARM [9] visualization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section II
defines the proposed approach including a brief explanation on
preliminaries, concepts, and definitions. Section III presents
the design and implementation of the cloud security assess-
ment framework. Discussion and limitations of this work are
given in Section IV. Section V summarizes the related work.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this work, we implement a cloud security assessment
framework which is able to monitor the cloud, analyze, and
deploy the three MTD techniques including Shuffle, Diversity,
and Redundancy on the real infrastructures of the cloud.
The main part of this paper is the automation of the cloud
assessment framework in the real cloud. The uses of APIs
in the implementation and automation of the project are
nontrivial. Automation process needs a deep understanding of
the infrastructures and platforms in which the private cloud
uses. On the other hand, the security analysis framework
should be able to handle the cloud constraints defined by both
cloud provider and security experts such as uses of services,
access to controllers, etc.. This work includes four main
phases elucidated as follows. (1) Information Collection, (2)
Cloud Security Modeling using HARM, (3) Security Analysis
Engine, (4) Deployment Phase.
1) Preliminaries: In this section, we describe the related
concepts and definitions used throughout this paper. We first
define a running example as the main scenario for the mi-
gration of enterprises to the cloud. Later on, we deploy the
proposed scenario together with the proposed approach on the
UniteCloud.
A. Running Example
Fig. 1 shows the running example scenario on the migrations
of two independent organizations entitled Enterprise-1 (EP1)
and Enterprise-2 (EP2) to a private cloud. Those companies de-
cide to cut off the physical equipment and use a private cloud
for accommodating their computing needs. Each organization
has launched 8 Virtual Machines (VMs) on the cloud together
with a Database (DB) creating a virtual network. We assume
Fig. 1: Running Example: a Cloud example including the dif-
ferent Hosts and Virtual Machines (VMs) of two organizations.
that the first four VMs use Windows10 instances and the rest
does Linux iUbuntu. Moreover, the vm0 for both organizations
are connected to the Internet. Later on, we deploy the running
example shown in Fig. 1 in the UniteCloud.
1) System model: System constraints are usually defined
based on both cloud provider and security experts. For in-
stance, the cloud provider can determine which cloud zones
or physical hosts are available for the customers. Moreover,
the cloud provider can set the limitations on the physical
hosts such as defining the maximum VMs can be located
on each host and etc.. The system constraints are defined
due to different reasons like workload balance or energy
saving, security purposes [15]. On the other hand, the security
experts of enterprises migrated into the cloud may have their
own security policies like defining firewalls rules and Access
Control Lists (ACL).
2) Attack Model: We assume that an attacker can launch the
attacks from outside of the cloud using exploiting the software
vulnerabilities of the VMs connected to the Internet. Then, the
attacker can launch a series of other attacks in order to access
the DB along the identified attack paths.
B. Security Modeling
In this paper, we use HARM [6], [9] for graphical security
modeling and analysis and MTD evaluation. HARM consists
of two hierarchical layers which use an AG in the upper layer
and an AT in the lower layer. The upper layer captures the
reachability of nodes (in here, VMs) and the lower layer
holds the vulnerabilities information. Security modeling is
the first phase of the cloud security framework. Security
modeling consists of two phases: (1) information collection,
(2) HARM creation shown as steps 1 and 2 in Fig. 2.
First, the cloud infrastructure should be scanned in order to
obtain Hosts, VMs, and reachability information. Then, the
vulnerabilities existing on each VM should be obtained using
the vulnerability scanning tools [16]. Information gathering is
a crucial phase for the security modeling. In the next step,
an HARM can be constructed using the obtained information.
The reachability information can be used to generate the upper
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Fig. 2: Security Modeling, Analysis, and Deployment Phases
layer of HARM where an AG is used to show all the possible
attack scenarios given system and attack model. Moreover, the
vulnerabilities information can be used to construct the lower
layer of HARM which uses the ATs. However, generating
ATs from vulnerabilities needs a clear understanding of the
vulnerabilities and the way in which they can be exploited.
For instance, an attacker can exploit only one vulnerability to
penetrate into a VM, or the attacker may need to exploit a
set of vulnerabilities to penetrate into a VM. In the former
case a logical OR-gate can be used and for the latter, a
combination of logical AND/OR-gates can be used [17]. The
uses of logical AND/OR-Gates and computation approach are
presented in [17]. However, a security expert can help to
define the vulnerabilities relations. Entry points of the cloud
are actually the VMs connected to the Internet. Those VMs
are the entry points of the attacks as well. The target could be
any VM which includes important information or runs crucial
services. We assume that the DB is the attackers’ target. Both
entry points and target are captured in the upper layer of the
HARM. The upper layer of HARM can be generated using
reachability information obtained from analyzing the firewall
rules.
C. Security Analysis
Security analysis engine has two main phases: general
security evaluation and MTD evaluation. In order to assess
the cloud security, the security experts can choose or prior-
itize the use of the security metrics based on their security
requirements. One of the most important metrics is cloud risk
value which shows the overall (system) risk associated with the
cloud. Other security metrics like Attack Costs, the probability
of attack success, Mean Time to Attack (MTTA),etc. [18] can
also be added to a set (or pool) of the security. HARM can
be adopted based on the security metrics pool and compute
the security metrics for analysis. It uses the values of each
vulnerability represented at the lower layer of HARM such as
Impact, Exploitability, CVE CVSS Base Score and uses them
through a bottom-up approach. The detailed explanation of the
security metrics and the calculation steps is given in [18].
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section provides the design and development of a secu-
rity analysis framework for cloud computing. We investigate
the feasibility and practical requirements such as Software
tools, packages, programming interfaces, libraries in order to
implement and automate the security analysis tool and MTD
techniques in the real-world cloud deployment. We develop a
framework which can perform security modeling, evaluation,
MTD deployment for enterprises migrated into the private
clouds. The cloud security framework is able to automate
information collection: cloud scanning, vulnerability scanning,
HARM creation, security evaluation, and MTD deployment
on a real cloud infrastructure. To implement the framework
we utilize a private cloud named UniteCloud and develop
our framework on UniteCloud as a case study. However, we
believe that our developed framework can be adopted for other
private clouds as well.
A. Case Study: UniteCloud Analysis
The UniteCloud uses the OpenStack cloud platform. For
setting up the project, we can either use OpenStack horizon
dashboard or utilize OpenStack APIs. The setup process
TABLE I: Configuration and setup for VMs and hosts in the
cloud. Note: floating IPs are denoted as asterisked
Host &
Zone Name
VM
Name OS
IP
Addresses
Flavor
Size
h0
IBMZone
vm1-EP2 Win10
172.16.7.33
192.168.1.100∗ m1.medium
vm2-EP2 Win10 172.16.7.32 m1.medium
vm5-EP2 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.7.39 m1.generic
vm3-EP2 Win10 172.16.7.36 m1.medium
vm7-EP1 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.19.16 m1.generic
vm0-EP1 Win10
172.16.19.14
192.168.1.239∗ m1.medium
vm0-EP2 Win10
172.16.7.35
192.168.1.149∗ m1.medium
vm1-EP1 Win10
172.16.19.12
192.168.1.63∗ m1.medium
h1
IBMZone
vm4-EP2 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.7.37 m1.generic
vm6-EP1 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.19.18 m1.generic
vm2-EP1 Win10 172.16.19.15 m1.medium
vm3-EP1 Win10 172.16.19.11 m1.medium
h2
HPZone
vm6-EP2 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.7.40 m1.generic
vm5-EP1 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.19.19 m1.generic
h3
HPZone
vm7-EP2 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.7.38 m1.generic
vm4-EP1 Ubuntu14.04 172.16.19.17 m1.generic
includes the creation of VMs with different flavors and OS,
assigning internal and floating IP addresses, defining firewall
rules and ACL, etc. However, we first create the cloud example
VMs shown in Fig. 1 into the UniteCloud infrastructures using
the horizon dashboard. Further, we utilize the OpenStack APIs
for automation. Table I shows the created VMs including the
related information on each host. The cloud consisting of
16 physical Hosts (Compute Hosts) is distributed over three
availability zones: IBMZone, HPZone, and Nova. However, in
this paper, we used four hosts each of which includes different
VMs. We assign two flavors for the VMs: m1.medium and
m1.generic. The specification of the former VM is 2 VCPUs,
4 GB RAM, and 80 GB Disk, and that of the latter is 1
VCPUs, 1 GB RAM, and 20 GB Disk, respectively. We assign
two floating IPs for both vm0 and vm1 of two enterprises
denoting the entry points of the cloud. Moreover, both vm7
of enterprises are connected to the DB.
Fig. 3: Security framework and communication overview.
B. Cloud Security Framework
The cloud security framework utilizes the following pro-
gramming languages, tools, and concepts: .NET Core, JSON,
JavaScript, jQuery Ajax, Python, Nessus [16], Data-Driven
Documents JavaScript (D3.js). In this section, we show the
implementation of the cloud security framework. An overview
of the prototype and related tools and communication is shown
in Fig. 3. The security framework consists of a backend engine
and user interface (UI). The backend engine is responsible
for information collection, security modeling, analysis, and
deployment phases which are demonstrated in Fig. 2. The UI
is used for interactions between security experts of enterprises
and the backend engine for configuration and visualization
purposes. The generated graphical security model can be
visualized in the UI.
1) Information Collection Automation: As stated earlier,
cloud infrastructure information including VMs and hosts, and
the reachability of VMs are required for constructing the upper
layer of HARM, and vulnerabilities associated to each VM are
required to create the lower layer of HARM. Cloud security
framework needs to automatically fetch two information: (1)
cloud information such as the number of VMs, the number of
physical hosts, the host of each VM, the reachability between
the VMs and (2) vulnerabilities information existing on each
VM. We use .NET Core as the backend engine programming
language and call APIs in order to access both OpenStack
and Nessus automatically and fetch information. Accessing
to the UniteCloud OpenStack consists of two parts: Open-
Stack authentication and fetching information. OpenStack uses
Keystone feature for user authentication. Moreover, it uses
nove-computes, neutron-networks, Glance-images features for
different purposes such as accessing to compute nodes (VMs,
Hosts, Zones, etc). In order to access to the OpenStack and
retrieve the information, we first need to access keystone using
APIs for authentication. The username, password, and domain
name are sent to the Keystone controller using a JSON API
call for authentication. Once the user is authenticated using
the Keystone authenticaion method, OpenStack sends a re-
sponse including the authentication token (X-Subject-Token),
other OpenStack Controllers’ address including nova, neutron,
glance, cinder, etc. which can be used for further API calls.
Fig. 4: OpenStack API Calls for information collection phase.
The received message should be first parsed to receive the
authentication token together with the nova controller address.
Then, the backend engine sends another API call using the
authentication token and the nova controller to gather the list
of VMs and Hosts. The received message contains unneces-
sary/irrelevant information including VM status, availability
zone, created and updated time, etc., the message should
be parsed to fetch only the required information. Similarly,
another API including the authentication token and neutron
controller should be called to get network-related information.
The received information should be again parsed to obtain
VMs’ IP addresses and the reachability of VMs. Fig. 4
demonstrates the API calls and related responses between the
cloud security framework and OpenStack in order to gain the
information. Beside the VMs and reachability information, we
need vulnerabilities information for each VM on the cloud. We
use Nessus [16] to scan the cloud and obtain vulnerabilities.
In the next step, cloud security framework uses a backend
engine to access to Nessus and retrieve the vulnerabilities’
information. the first API called is used for authentication.
Having obtained the response message, the backend engine
sends other API calls using the authentication token in order
to get the vulnerability information. the extracted information
contains useful information related to Vulnerability, possible
threats, Base Score[19], severity, etc., CVE identifier (CVE-
ID). However, cloud security framework only need CVE-ID
for selected vulnerabilities so that it can obtain the other infor-
mation such as vulnerability impact and exploitability through
National Vulnerability Database (NVD)[19]. The pseudocode
for the overall information collection is shown in Algorithm 1.
Note that the measured time is only for API calls and re-
sponses times, and the cloud vulnerability scanning time is not
measured. However, cloud scanning using Nessus is a time-
consuming process and cannot be done frequently. Instead, it
can be run once a while to keep the vulnerabilities updated,
or run once a change catches on the VMs such as adding new
VM, or changing OS, services, etc.
2) HARM Creation: The upper layer of HARM can be
generated using the VMs and reachability information ob-
tained from the previous step. This information is saved as
a key and value dictionary representing the VMs’ links as a
graph. Thus, the backend engine can generate the AG based
on the dictionary. The second part of the information obtained
from Nessus scanning is a dictionary of VMs and related
vulnerabilities on each VM which can be used to generate
the lower layer of HARM. The lower layer of HARM uses the
ATs. The backend Engine uses Python programming language
to generate HARM. However, other software and tools can
also be used like Gephi which is a network analysis and
visualization software package. The reason why we use Python
is the NetworkX feature which is a useful package for network
graph generation. Moreover, we use Python [8] as the security
analysis engine to compute security metrics and evaluate MTD
techniques.
3) Security Analysis Engine: Security analysis engine is
implemented on the backend engine using Python. It con-
Algorithm 1: Information Collection Procedure
/* Input info. needed for OpenStack (Ops) */
Data: Ops-user-credential, Keystone-Controller-Url
/* Input Info. needed for Nessus (NS) */
Data: NS-user-credential, Nessus-Session-Url
/* Result: Dictionaries of VMs and Reachability,
VMs and Vulnerabilities */
Result: VMs Links Dic, VMs Vuls Dic
1 begin
/* Cloud Scanning: fetch Host & VM info. */
2 Credential-Data←JSonConvert(Ops-user-credential)
3 JResult←API Call(Credential-Data, Keystone-Controller-Url)
4 Auth Token←Parse(JResult, Authentication)
5 Controllers List←Parse(JResult, Nova and Neutron Controllers)
6 Host-VM-Info← API Call(Auth Token, Nova-Controller)
7 Network-Info← API Call(Auth Token, Neutron-Controller)
/* Parsing and saving the fetched data */
8 Hosts List←Parse(Host-VM-Info, Hosts)
9 VMs List←Parse(Host-VM-Info, VMs)
10 Reachability List←Parse(Network-Info, Reachability)
11 VMs Links Dic = Create Dictionary[VM, VM]
/* Nessus Scanning: fetch vulnerabilities */
12 Credential-Data←JSonConvert(NS-user-credential)
13 JResult←API Call(Credential-Data, Nessus-Session-Url)
14 Auth Token←Parse(JResult, token)
15 JResult←API Call(Auth Token, Nessus-vulnerabilities-Url)
16 VMs Vuls Dic = Create Dictionary[VM, Vulnerabilities-List]
/* Get & save vulnerabilities on each VM */
17 foreach vm ∈ VMs List do
18 Vuls-Info←Parse(JResult, vm)
19 Add vm and Vuls-Info into VMs Vuls Dic
20 end
/* Return reachability of VMs */
Output: VMs Links Dic
/* Return vulnerabilities on each VM */
Output: VMs Vuls Dic
21 end
sists of security evaluation and MTD evaluation subroutine.
Security analysis engine uses the generated HARM and the
security metrics. Actually, security experts can choose various
security metrics and add them to the metric pools such as
System Risk, Attack Cost, MTTA, Attack Success Probabil-
ity. Once the security metrics are selected, security analysis
engine uses HARM for security evaluation and computing the
selected security metrics. Security analysis framework uses
MTD techniques as the main defensive strategies for security
the organisations on the cloud. However, deploying MTD
techniques could be limited based on system constraints. For
instance, VM-LM (Shuffle technique) might be restricted from
one host to another one due to lack of space on the target host,
or OS Diversification (a Diversity technique) could be limited
to only a few OS instances due to the cost of the licence for the
cloud provider. Thus, the MTD techniques should be chosen
based on the defined system constraints.
4) MTD Deployment Implementation: The final phase of
the cloud security framework is the deployment of selected
MTD techniques on the cloud infrastructure. It uses .NET Core
and OpenStack APIs to deploy MTD techniques, it utilizes
Fig. 5: OS Diversification: Ubuntu14.04 replaces with Cen-
tOS7 for vm6-EP2.
glance for creating and retrieving OS instance images, nove,
and network controllers for accessing and manipulating VMs
and Network purposes.
a) Diversity: Security analysis framework uses OS di-
versification technique for deploying Diversity. In order to
deploy Diversity technique, backend engine uses nove to
access the desired VM and update the VM instances with
another OS image. Similar to the information collection phase,
the user credential information should be sent to the Keystone
controller using JSON API call for authentication. Backend
engine omits this phase as the authentication token is already
received in information collection phase; moreover, both nove
and glance controllers are fetched from the response message.
Before calling API to change the VM instance, we need to
fetch the ImageRef by sending an API to glance. Once the
response received, the ImageRef associated to the desired VM
image can be obtained. Finally, an API should be called to
pass the authentication token, VM ID, ImageRef to the nova
in order to rebuild the VM with another OS variant. Fig 5
shows the results of calling APIs for replacing Ubuntu14.04
with CentOS7 for vm6-EP2 on the cloud. Note that Diversity
preserves the VM’s physical host
b) Redundancy: Based on the Redundancy definition,
different replicas of a VM should be created so that each
replica has the same feature as the main VM. For instance,
the replicated VMs should have the same OS, Flavor, inbound
and outbound links from/to other VMs, and should be located
on the same physical host. The only difference is the newly
assigned IP addresses. Backend engine is responsible for
deploying redundancy. However, the number of replicas for
deploying redundancy is chosen by either MTD evaluation part
or expert entry using UI. There is no feature on OpenStack to
create replication for each VM. Thus, deploying redundancy
Fig. 6: OS Replication: Create 2 replicas for vm6-EP2.
Fig. 7: VM-LM: Migration ofvm6-EP2 from Compute07 to
Compute08.
on OpenStack needs creation r new VMs based on the similar
existing instance or copied snapshot. Backend engine can
use the same authentication token already obtained from the
information collection phase and use nova controller. Thus,
the backend engine sends an API to nove controller including
the authentication token, ImageRef, FlavorRef, NetworkID
together with a max count which is the number of required
replicas (r). Fig 6 demonstrates the results of calling APIs for
the creation of two new replicas of vm6-EP2 with the same
OS, links, hosts, flavors, but different IP addresses.
c) Shuffle: In this framework, VM-LM is used as the
Shuffle technique. VM-LM can be deployed on the OpenStack
using nova controller. Similar to other MTD techniques, the
backend engine omits the authentication API call because
the authentication token and nove controllers have already
been fetched in the information collection section. The target
host can be selected either by MTD evaluation results or
security experts. In order to deploy VM-LM, an API including
authentication token together with the VM ID and Target Host
ID is called. Fig 7 demonstrates the results of calling APIs for
migration of vm6-EP2 from Compute07 to Compute08.
C. User Interface (UI) Implementation
Cloud security framework uses a UI in order to interact
between the security experts of enterprises and backend en-
gine. Security experts can add update the security metrics
pool, choose MTD techniques, analyze and monitor the cloud
security using visualization panel. UI is implemented as a
web application using JavaScript, JSON, jQuery Ajax, and
D3.js interacting with the backend engine. UI web application
includes two different perspectives for visualization. Cloud
provider and security model previews. Cloud provider preview
illustrates the internal connection of the VMs, routers, subnets,
and etc. in the cloud, and security model preview visualizes
the generated upper layer of HARM which captures the
reachability of VMs based on the firewall rules and possible
attack scenarios. UI also shows the vulnerabilities captured for
each VM . UI uses internal APIs to communicate with backend
engine and update and gain information. Fig. 8 demonstrates
the UI panel showing two different previous based on the
UniteCloud network and HARM view.
Fig. 8: Cloud security framework UI panel: UniteCloud Graph
view and HARM visualization.
IV. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION
Backend engine is the base of the cloud security framework
which use the OpenStack APIs to create security, perform
security analysis, and deploy MTD techniques. The backend
engine is responsible for automating the information collection
APIs and MTD deployment APIs. The feasibility and practica-
bility of implementing the backend using OpenStack API calls
is important. We evaluated the usability of the backend engine
by considering the API calls passing through the backend
and two other parties: Nessus vulnerability scanning tool, and
OpenStack controllers. The details of API calls like the type
of APIs and elapsed times are elucidated in this section.
a) APIs Automation Evaluation: Table II shows the
details of API calls including the required fields, received
messages together with the elapsed time for each call and
response. Cloud security framework uses two types of APIs
which can be categorized as informative calls and operational
calls. The first group can be only used to get the information
like getting authentication tokens, list of hosts, VMs, etc., these
APIs will not make any changes on the cloud. Unlike the first
group, operational calls can perform an operation on the cloud
and make the changes such as migrating a VM from one host
to another one, or changing the VM’s instance, etc. Obviously,
the response time (RT) for informative calls are deterministic.
It means the response time of a keystone authentication call
is the time elapsed between calling API and receiving the
response from keystone. However, informative calls consist
of: (1) an RT which is the time between calling API and
receiving the response (the response can be an acknowledge
for the requested API such as accepted, denied, abort, etc.),
(2) operational time (OT) which means the difference between
the start of an operation using API calls and the time in which
the task is fully done. For instance, the total time between the
start of a VM-LM process and the end of the process. Usually
OT is greater than RT. The total RT for informative calls
passed through backend engine is around 2562 milliseconds
(ms). Nessus scanning APIs is also categorized as informative
calls for authentication and vulnerability information fetches.
The total measured RT for Nessus scanning APIs is about
4509 ms. Note that, cloud scanning using Nessus servers is
a separate process and is not included in Nessus scanning
APIs. Deploying MTD API calls fall into both informative and
operational calls, but as OT is greater than RT the informative
calls covers operational calls. The OT for MTD techniques are
asterisked in Table II.
TABLE II: API JSON calls and related information including
the (RT). Note: the asterisked times are (OT)
API
Calls Type Content
Time
(ms)
Cloud Scanning APIs
M1 Request [User, Password, Domain], [Keystone Controller] 356
M2 Response [Authentication Token, Controllers’ URL]
M3 Request [Authentication Token], [Nova Controller]
1997M4 Response [List of Servers, Hosts, Zones, etc.]
M5 Request [Authentication Token], [Neutron Controller]
209M6 Response [Networks, Routers, Ports, etc]
Nessus Scanning APIs
M1 Request [User, Password], [Nessus Session URL]
471M2 Response [Token]
M3 Request [Token], [Nessus Session URL]
4038M4 Response [CVE-IDs, etc.]
Diversity APIs: OS Diversification
M1 Request [Authentication Token], [glance controller URL]
559M2 Response [List of images (OS instances)]
M3 Request [Authentication Token], [VM ID, ImageRef, Nova]
18081∗M4 Response [Status: accepted or abort]
Redundancy APIs: VM Replicas
M1 Request [Token], [Image&FlavorRef, max count, Nova]
12091∗M2 Response [Status: accepted or abort]
Shuffle APIs: VM-LM
M1 Request [Auth. Token], [VM ID, Host ID, Nova controller]
7216∗M2 Response [Migration Status]
b) Limitations: The update phase has not been imple-
mented in cloud security framework. This includes running
of Nessus scanning and recreation of HARM based on any
changes captured in the cloud, such as updating VMs or
vulnerabilities. We will further consider the update phase in
our future work. Moreover, more in-depth evaluations for
MTD techniques on real cloud infrastructure are needed such
as performance analysis, measuring system downtime, etc.
V. RELATED WORK
The theoretical investigation and evaluation of the security
modeling and analysis adopting based on the MTD techniques
for cloud computing have been proposed in the work [9], [11].
However, most of the proposed frameworks have focused on
the implementations of GSMs on the networks [20], [21], [7],
[8]. The security modeling and analysis tools on the literature
can be categorized based on the context of implementation
test-bed such as cloud computing [22], networks and enter-
prises [23], or based on GSMs [6], ATs [21], AGs [24],
[20], etc., the automation approaches and levels [25], or based
on the effectiveness of solution like response time and the
probability of success[25]. The work [7] proposed a prototype
for 3D graphical visualization of the system, attack, and coun-
termeasure model. The work [23]proposed and implemented
a fast network security assessment prototype based on the
real scenario. However, the work [22] developed a framework
named NICE in the virtual network systems which is able to
detect possible attacks against the cloud infrastructure. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no prior work developing the
MTD techniques incorporated with the automated GSMs in a
cloud environment. In this paper, we developed an automated
cloud security framework able to monitor and detect a private
cloud and deploy MTD techniques on the infrastructures of
the cloud.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated on practicability and
usability of incorporating MTD techniques into GSMs as a
framework on the real cloud. We have developed a cloud
security framework which is able to run on a private cloud
platform named UniteCloud. The developed framework can 1)
automatically monitor the cloud and collect the information
such as hosts, VMs, network, and vulnerabilities existing
on each VM using OpenStack APIs, 2) model and evaluate
the cloud’s security and adopt defensive MTD techniques,
3) automate the deployment of three MTD techniques OS
Diversification as the Diversity technique, VM replication
as the Redundancy technique, and VM-LM as the shuffle
technique on the infrastructures of the UniteCloud using API
calls, and 4) use a web application UI for interaction between
the security experts and the backend engine of the framework
and also visualize the generated security model.
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